Jessica Peake 0:00

Hey, hi everyone. Welcome. Welcome back to the start of the new semester at the law school, at least. I know our undergrad friends aren't quite back yet, but it's great to see so many people in the room. Um, for those of you that I haven't met yet, my name is Jess Peake. I am the Director of the International and Comparative Law Program and also the Assistant Director of the Promise Institute for Human Rights here at UCLA School of Law, and I'm delighted to welcome all of you here today for our event, which will be a conversation with Josh Paul, former Director of the US State Department, Bureau of Political Military Affairs. This event is presented to you by the Burkle Center for International Relations, the Promise Institute for Human Rights and the International and Comparative Law program. Before we get started, and on behalf of these programs, we would like to acknowledge UCLA presence on the traditional ancestral and unceded territory of the Gabrielino Tongva people. So, I'm just going to do very, very brief introductions for our two speakers today, our speaker and our moderator today, and then I will pass things over to Josh for his opening remarks. So, our main speaker is Josh Paul. And Josh resigned from the State Department in October of 2023 due to his disagreement with the Biden administration's decision to rush lethal military assistance to Israel in the context of its war on Gaza. He had previously spent over 11 years working as the director in the Bureau of Political Military Affairs, which is responsible for us, defense diplomacy, security assistance and arms transfers. He previously worked on security sector reform in both Iraq and the West Bank, and as a congressional staffer for Representative Steve Israel, a Democrat from New York. Josh grew up between London and New York, and holds master's degrees from the universities of Georgetown and St Andrews. And he is currently a non-resident Fellow at the organization Democracy Now for the Arab world, or DAWN, is the acronym. And he is also a recipient of the 2023 Callaway Award for Civic Courage. Josh will present for about the first 20 to 25 minutes, and then we will move to a moderated conversation with Professor Kal Raustiala, who is the Promise Institute Distinguished Professor of Comparative and International Law at UCLA Law School. He's also a professor at the UCLA International Institute, Faculty Director of the International Comparative Law Program and the Promise Institute for Human Rights. And Director of the UCLA Ronald Burkle Center for International Relations. So, Josh, I'll hand things over to you.

Josh Paul 2:31

Thank you. Can everyone hear me? Yes, great. Well, first of all, thank you very much. Thank you to UCLA for hosting me. I think it's important to show that we can have respectful conversations about what has been a very difficult issue for people to discuss in this country and on campuses across America, including this one. So, thank you all. Just before I get into this presentation, let me also say, well, let me by way of further introduction, just just talk about, you know why I'm here, which is my resignation from the State Department back in October. As you've just heard, I was working in something called the Bureau of Political, Military Affairs, and when people think about defense trade, about arms transfer, normally they think of the US Defense Department. You don't think about the State Department. But in fact, these authorities are, for the most part, vested in the State Department of Captain for many years, essentially since the post World War II era, since the Marshall Plan on the premise that when the US transfers arms, when the US gives countries assistance with their security, those are tools of foreign policy. As much as they are building up the military forces of partners and allies. They are also providing the US with influence, with relationships, with leverage, even when we don't actually use that leverage, which we'll talk about. So, that's why this is in the State Department. That's where I was working. I left on October 18. It was my last day in the office for three main reasons. First of all, I believe, and I believe for a long time, the US policy towards the Middle East, but in particular, towards Israel and Palestine, is broken. But we are at the end of a process of the ongoing process that is now moribund, that is not leading to peace that is not leading to security for Israel or to justice for the Palestinians. And yet we continue to pay this process lip service, even as we take actions that undermine it. But really, this was about Gaza. And you know, when I left on October 18, already, by that point, three and a half 1000 people had died in Gaza, most of them at the hand of US weapons. US weapons funded by the US taxpayer. There had certainly been a number of controversial issues in which I'd been involved, controversial policy decisions in the Bureau of Military Affairs. There's no way to get around controversy and morally complex issues when you are working on security and arms transfers to US partners around the world. But I've never, in my experience, been faced with an instance of so much damage being done in so little time with so little apparent care for that damage by those carrying it out. By the time I left, as I said, there were already three and a half thousand who had died in Gaza. We had seen, as well, statements from senior Israeli government officials that we are calling for a total siege, no electricity, no food. The President of Israel say this is a whole nation that is responsible, and we saw the IDF acting accordingly. Since then, of course, the catastrophe has only deepened, both in terms of the direct casualties of the conflict, currently listed above 40,000 and by some projections, much higher, as well as, of course, the lasting humanitarian consequences when you destroy the hospitals, the schools, the universities, the water treatment plants, the electricity plants, the food distribution mechanisms, and all of that for a population of 2.3 million people. So scale and scope of what was happening. And the third reason I resigned and we'll discuss this was the lack of ability to do anything about it. In every single controversial or challenging issue that I've been a part of discussing in the State Department, for example, the operations of the Saudi led coalition in Yemen, in which there were, as well, many thousands of civilians killed as a function of US arms. There was always, even in those discussions, even in those decisions, the opportunity to have some influence, to talk about, what can we do to mitigate the worst possible outcomes, to delay certain arms transfers until a moment of crisis had passed, to take steps with the country to strengthen oversight or training, or whatever it might be. That was for the first time in my experience in State Department, which is an organization that is essentially structured to encourage debate, absolute. There was no interest in having a discussion. There was no time for a discussion. There was simply direction coming from the very senior levels of the White House and of the department that what Israel requests, you will approve, and you will do so today. And so faced with, again, the essentially the end point of the Morrigan policy, the scale and scope of the disaster on the ground, and the absence of any ability to do anything about it. I thought that there was a need for that, for debate. That debate, if it couldn't be had in government, deserve to be had by the American people. And to bring it out there, out of government, you have to resign.

Josh Paul 7:54

So, I have a brief presentation here. I This isn't exactly my normal presentation, but you know, recognizing that many of you here are law students. Actually, can I just see hands up from which of you are law students? Okay, I thought I would focus a bit more than I normally do on some of the legal issues. I don't know if any of you are discussing or studying National Security Law, but there's plenty to get into here. So, first of all, just wanted to, and I'm going to dive right into the weeds here, I'm afraid, but talk about what we're talking about, right? My view on all of this is from the political military perspective. My focus has been security assistance and arms transfers. Many people in the media, in particular, use those terms interchangeably. They're not from a state department perspective, right? So there are two different things. Security assistance is US taxpayer money that we give to countries around the world, to the tune of, you know, under the State Department, about 10 billion a year, from the Defense Department, another about 10 billion a year to fund that their defense procurements, mostly US arms, although not always, and to build their security capacity. Arms Transfers are the actual mechanism of, you know how you transfer arms to another country, regardless of how it is funded, right? So security assistance is one bucket that's that's the question of, if it's us money on transfers of transfers, regardless of money. Those, those forms of us, security assistance, you know, the main one is foreign financing. This is appropriated to the State Department. It's on an average year, about $6.1 billion dollars. Of that 6.1 billion, Israel gets 3.3 billion. So, more than half of US State Department of the principal mechanism for security assistance is going to Israe. Just FYI, and this is a bit of detour, but 3.3 billion for Israel, 1.3 billion annually for Egypt, about 400 million for Jordan, about 200 million for Lebanon. By the time you get done with the Middle East, there's really not much money to go to anyone else. So, the time that we keep talking, and have been talking since the Obama administration about a rebalance, or a pivot to Asia, it's hard to see how our resource allocations line up with our strategy. DOD has some funding when it comes to Israel. The Missile Defense Agency has $500 million a year to work with Israel on missile defense, and there are a few other authorities as well. I think it's worth also just backing up before we get any further into the research, just talking about the history of our relationship with Israel.

Josh Paul 10:36

A lot of people have the sense that it's always been this way, it's always going to be this way, and there's nothing you can do about it. And the history shows that's just not true. And so I think it's worth just quickly running through, right? So, 1948 Israel's War of Independence, it doesn't fight with American weapons. It actually fights with Soviet Bloc weapons, and, in fact, Czech weapons. And at the time, there was still a very open question on whether this nation state of Israel would end up aligning with the Soviet Bloc or with the Western Bloc. So, that's where we started in 1956, right? Almost a decade later, Israel teams up with the UK and France in this operation to capture the Suez Canal, and it's President Eisenhower who steps in and says, essentially, cut it out, or I will call in the loans from the three countries and stop the preparation. Sixety-seven or 1967, a six day war. Israel conquers the West Bank, Gaza and, at the time, Sinai Peninsula as well. Again, not a war Israel fought with American weapons, a war Israel fought with French and British weapons for the most part. It's not until 1973 the Yom Kippur War, the October War, where Israel is being attacked by the United Arab Republic, by Syria from the north, Egypt from the south, that the Prime Minister at the time, called Meir calls up Richard Nixon and says, we desperately need your military assistance. And Nixon's initial response is, "eh."

Josh Paul 12:06

And it's not until Penny Kissinger steps in and says to Nixon, no, no, this is a strategic priority. This is a Cold War issue. We need to provide assistance that the US actually steps in and provides what was from that time until just last year in the context of Ukraine, the single biggest security assistance package the US has ever provided to a country in operation middle grass. The 70s are when this sort of operation or when this relationship begins to gel. It's very much in the context of the Cold War. So, for example, we have in 78' Camp David Accords, where President Carter brings together Israel and Egypt. Of course, a significant part of that the intent of the US is to bring Egypt out of the Soviet camp and into the Western camp. And that's where this annual budget, this annual donation to both Israel and to Egypt, these billions of dollars start. The 70s are also significant, and this is where we begin to touch on law, because 1976 is the first time the US Congress passes a law addressing Israel's qualitative military edge, many of other show pans. Any of you have heard of qualitative military edge? 345 right? So, qualitative military edge, or Q&E is to this day, US law, whenever the US is considering an arms transfer to another country in the Middle East, we must first consider what the impact of that arms transfer will be on Israel's ability to defend itself from one country, any combination countries, while sustaining minimal damage. So in all of our military relationships with other countries in the Middle East, in all of our strategic calculus, the thing we have to put at the top of the list is Israel. And if Israel's qualitative military edge is going to be undermined, there are three options. Don't proceed with the sale, proceed with the sale, but find a way to provide less cutting edge technology to the country in question, or fewer items, or whatever it might be, or provide it, and then you'll have to provide Israel with the capability to beat it, right? So that's the 70s. Then we you know, but you know. And so the relationship gels even when we get to the 80s, though you still have in 1981, for example, Israel invades Lebanon in order to attack the PLO who were based there at the time, begins a bombardment of Beirut fourteen hours into that bombardment, and you can read this in President Reagan's diaries, Reagan calls out the Israeli Prime Minister Begin, and says to him, essentially, you've got to stop this now. And if you don't stop this, I will tell you two things that will be true. First of all, the world's impression of Israel will be a baby with its arm with its legs blown off, because that was the photo on the front page. And second of all, America will fundamentally revisit the nature of its relationship with Israel, right? That's of course, you cannot imagine President Biden having today, not fourteen hours into what's been happening in Gaza, but eleven months. And again, and again we, see US president, using the leverage of our security systems and all arms transfers to push Israel. For example, into the Madrid talks under the Bush administration. Back to the table under the second Bush administration. To in some ways, stop some of the cross border fire that is going on with Gaza in repeated operations during President Obama's tenure. So, there has been a track record of, first of all, that this hasn't always been this situation, but also that the US has been waiting to use this leverage. Finally, we get to this sort of current era, Oslo in 1995. Part of the Oslo commitment is that in five years time, there will be a Palestinian state. You get to the end of that five year period, of course, Prime Minister Rabin, as your president, Rabin, has been assassinated. The Palestinian state hasn't come into being. There is a second intifada. Then there, in 2006 a Palestinian civil war in which Gaza and the West Bank become essentially politically separated, and we have this status that we have now, the status quo up till at least October 7, in which settlements expand in the West Bank, making a Palestinian state there ever more impossible, ever more unattainable. Hamas is entrenched in Gaza, and essentially the approach from the West, and from the United States, in particular, appears to have become, well, maybe this isn't a sortable issue. We'll just put it in the box, forget about it, and proceed with the rest of our regional strategy. So, that's just to run through the industry, the relationship, right. Sorry. Back to my security assistance piece.

Josh Paul 16:38

I'll click through this very quickly so on that foreign military financing we're talking about, right? So, most of it, it's all appropriate by Congress. Most of it is annual, but sometimes you get supplementals, as we did this past year. Conditionality, so, Congress can write into law conditions on countries what they have to do to get their assistance. So, for example, Egypt gets $1.3 billion a year. 300 million of that is conditioned on Egypt's progress on human rights. It doesn't get that 300 million unless it is making progress on human rights, unless the Secretary of State says, no, no, it's really important that it does for some reason, for national security reasons. I think it's also worth noting that when you think about human rights and US arms transfers and security assistance, most of the laws that relate to human rights don't apply to secure to arms transfers, right? They don't attach themselves to the mechanism of transfer. They attach themselves when it's US taxpayer money. So, you may have heard of the Leahy Law. Leahy Law said we cannot give security assistance to a foreign military unit that is credibly alleged to have committed gross violations of human right. Not has committed, is credibly alleged to have committed. That law only applies if it's us money. So, if we go back to the Saudi-Yemen example, Saudi led cohesion in Yemen, Leahy was not a question there, right, vast human rights abuses being committed, growth violations human rights, but the Saudis were paying for everything themselves, so no concerns under Leahy. Leahy does apply when talking about security assistance funding and couple of other differences worth noting, Israel for military financing, unlike the rest of the world. So, for most countries in the world, if Congress appropriates money and the State Department decides to give it to a foreign country, or Congress says, give it to a foreign country, before you move forward, you have to notify Congress, and there's a whole process of consultation and discussion about how you're going to use the money, what are they going to use it oo, all this sort of thing. In case of Israel, it is considered obligated upon appropriation, which means as soon as the President signs that annual appropriations bill, off it goes, not like almost every other country in the world to the Defense Department to hold on to until it's spent, but to an interest bearing account in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Where Israel then accrues interest from the US Federal Reserve. Right? So that's the assistance mechanisms of transfer. There are, there are, you know, a few. The two main ones to think about, here are foreign military sales. Those are government to government transfers. And then there are direct commercial sales, which are commercial export licenses for US companies to export defense articles, weapons, that sort of thing. Quick note, right?

Josh Paul 19:21

So, Foreign Ministry sales is about $50 billion a year. Direct commercial sales is about $130 billion a year. US is by far the world's largest arms exporter. You know that 100 and $80 billion is about 41% of the global market, and increasing actually right now, as a percentage and as a as a top line a couple of other mechanisms. So, when we think about arms transfer process, as I said, there are very few laws that require when it comes to human rights, but there is a conventional arms transfer policy. And every administration since Carter has issued its own conventional arms transfer policy. And to its credit, the Biden administration's is the best yet. Right, at least, if you look at the words for the first time, typically the convention or the patent policies, we call it, has been just essentially a framework of, here are things to think about, as you are exporting arms. Think about human rights. Think about regional balance. Think about the US economy. The poor defense companies. But no sort of absolute strictures under the Biden administration to enter arms policy issued in February of 2023, it says for the first time that the transfer of arms shall not be authorized if it is more likely than not that the weapons will either be used to violate international humanitarian law, international law will be used to increase the risk of harm to at risk populations, including children. And so it says that shall not be authorized, right? The cat policy is not law. It's just policy. So, even though it is directive in this case, first of all, the State Department's firm position is that our arms exports to Israel are not more likely than not to aggravate the risk of harm to children or violations of international law. But even if they thought it was, there's nothing to stop them from saying, yeah, but we're still going to do this. Other thing I want to note here is that these processes I'm talking about foreign military sales, direct commercial sales are bottom up processes. What do I mean by that?

Josh Paul 21:07

Under each process, under foreign sales, a country comes in the door and says, we want to buy fighter jets. Under direct commercial sales, a company, a US, company, comes in the door and says, we want to export munitions that goes to a junior licensing officer in the State Department who looks at it and says, OK, there are going to be 10 different offices in the State Department that need to look at this, maybe some folks in the Defense Department, and they farm it out. So, it goes to the subject matter, on human rights, on fighter jets or on munitions, on regional policy. And then once there's consensus, it goes up to the next layer, and then it goes up to the next layer, and eventually goes up to, typically, the assistant secretary or under secretary level at the State Department, and gets approved. So, bottom up processes. And then finally, there are congressional notification requirements that apply to major arms sales, which are defined by value.

Josh Paul 21:24

There is an informal or tiered review process with the oversight committees in Congress. And then there is a formal notification upon which Congress can try to block an arms sale if it wants to disapprove it through a mechanism called Joint Resolution Disapproval. You will see one of these pop up next week, right? So, over the summer, Israel, the Biden administration, rather notified $20 billion worth of arms sales to Israel. By dollar value this is the biggest arms package ever, including F 15 fighter jets, various munitions, a number of senators are going to introduce next week joint resolution of disapproval to try and stop this. They will not succeed. No joint resolution disapproval in history has ever succeeded, because ultimately, you require a two thirds majority in both houses to overcome presidential veto, and that's never happened. So again, bottom up process. I'm happy to shoot these slides to anyone who's really interested in the arms transfer review process, but there you go. Just also worth noting, Israel also has something called the war reserve stockpile. Warsaw.

Josh Paul 23:28

This is a stockpile of US weapons that are pre positioned in Israel, but upon a determination by the Secretary of Defense, doors open and Israel can go grab whatever it wants. And so, that has been used extensively. You cannot apply the commercial arms transfer policy if you don't have opportunity to review arms before they're transferred. That's what's happening here. No notification, no State Department review, and the recently passed supplemental just significantly expanded what is in that stockpile and how fast it can go. All right, applicable laws, so arms export control act, this is on the arms transfer side of things, says, first of all, that US arms can only be used for the purposes for which they were furnished. What are the purposes for which they are furnished? Internal security, legitimate self defense, preventing or hindering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, etc. So, first of all, I would argue human rights violations, international law violations, are not a purpose for which US weapons are ever furnished. I think you could also argue that none of these, anyway, apply in the context of Israel's war on Gaza, because Gaza is not part of Israel. So there goes the internal security piece. Legitimate self defense and occupying power, under international law, does not have a right of self defense against an occupied territory. So there goes that one, and so on and so forth. So, I think that's that's a difficult one to justify. There is also under the Export Control Act end use monitoring. You may have heard that term. It's not what it sounds like. So, end use monitoring doesn't actually, it's something the US is required to do for all weapons that we transfer in other countries, and we are required to do and conduct end use monitoring. We don't actually monitor the end use. The way the State Department and Defense Department interprets the law on end use monitoring, is it is there to make sure that weapons are not illegally retransferred or transferred to someone that we haven't approved, or are not being reverse engineered or re-engineered to steal the technology. It is not there to actually look at how the weapons are being used, and there is no real mechanism to do so. And then on the assistance side, the Foreign Assistance Act, applies there. So, there are a number of laws that should apply here, but I would argue are not being applied. Section 502 B, of the Foreign Assistance Act says we cannot provide assistance to a country that is engaged in a continuous pattern of human rights violations. You have section 620 i, which says that we cannot provide assistance to a country that is restricting US funded humanitarian assistance. If you look at Gaza, I think there have been numerous reports, including statements from US government officials, that Israel is restricting the supply of humanitarian assistance, resulting, by the way, in the fastest growing salvation of the population since World War II, and yet we have not invoked this. And of course, Leahy, as we just discussed. And for Leahy, whereas for every other country in the world, the process is before we provide assistance to a unit, we vet the unit, right? So, you know, the Colombian government comes in and says, we have a new counterterrorism task force, whatever it might be, we buy some funding for them, before we say yes, we say, give us the names. We'll do a search through both open sources and intelligence sources. And if there is a red flag, the most junior officer in the State Department's human rights Bureau can say, "sorry, red flag, they don't qualify for assistance. In the case of Israel, there is a different process. In the case of Israel, we provide the assistance first, no questions asked, right remember, obligated upon appropriation into the bank account, and then we listen out for allegations. There is something called the Israel may be vetting forum. It sits, it meets, it discusses incoming allegations of rights violations, of Bruce violations of human rights. The second step in that process, if they think that there is a potentially credible allegation, again, unlike other countries, is the phone is picked up and the call was made to Israel's. Have you heard about this? Are you doing anything about it? Are you taking it seriously? Do you think we should be taking it seriously? So again, unique process, and the first thing that's unique about the process is that, again, for every other country, there's a junior officer who can say red flag, no assistance. In the case of Israel, if it's red flag, no assistance, that is a decision that has to be made by the Deputy Secretary of State or the Secretary of State, and as we've seen in the last year, for the first time, so before I left, they had never concluded that an Israeli unit was ineligible for security assistance. In recent months, they have concluded there have indeed been four Israeli units who have been involved in credible allegations of gross violations of human rights, one of which, for example, included the killing of an American citizen. But Secretary Blinken has determined that nothing to see here. Don't worry about it. These units have all addressed these problems, and we can continue giving assistance. It's been remediated. So final slide, where are you? Where were we at the time that I left in particular? So first of all, remember, bottom up process, country or company comes in, and there's this whole filter process and policy making process, and eventually you get to a decision turned on its head. So in this context, after October 7, the it was a top down process. The instructions were coming from the top you will approve, right? This was guidance coming from senior levels of state and White House. So rather than a policy discussion, it was simply a you know, ye shall do so. Cat policy review, right when you have two hours to approve an arms sale, are you really sitting down and looking at these factors? And indeed, has the State Department been taking seriously the commercial armed transfer policy, which says the transfer of arms shall not be authorized when it's more likely than not that they will contribute to international law violations you may have seen the UK in just the last two days. Essentially has a very similar set of regulations that apply to armed transfers. And decided that the risk of international law violations meant that they had to suspend 30 pending open licenses of weapons to Israel. Very similar standard to the US standard, the Leahy, the human rights concerns, again, separate process and not being applied. There was also, I think it's worth noting, a search for any available authorities. So as the you know, Israel was conducting the opening days of its bombardment of Gaza, the State Department, the US government, was putting together a supplemental budget. Request for Congress, which eventually has sprint. And the first question from the Office of Management and Budget is, do we need new authorities? Do we need new legal authorities to even further expedite arms transfers and security assistance to Israel? The question that the answer went back from State Department is, no, we honestly don't. We've got every authority here we could possibly need. The answer that came back from OMB was come up with something new, because we need to show that we're doing everything we can so we can offer some new stuff. And that's where I was talking about, the expansion, for example, of the war reserve stockpile. There have also been in the last year, emergency arm sales, so using authorities within the law to bypass that regretful notification process entirely. And then you take all of that, you look at the harm, the scale and the scope of the damage that has been done in Gaza. You combine it with this moribund policy, you add in the no space for debate, and I think it's very clear that there are both policy and legal issues but warrants some significant and serious debate, not only in State Department, where it is not happening, it's still not properly happening, but Also here, particularly in a lawsuit. So, thank you.

Josh Paul 31:12

Applause.

Student Question 31:26

Okay, well, thank you very much. So, as Jess mentioned, I'm just going to have a brief conversation, couple of questions with Josh Paul, open it up to all of you, and then we'll take it until, I think, 12:15 to 12:30 depending on how our conversation goes. So first of all, it's very illuminating discussion of a lot of things that I think many of us in this room do not know about. So, I appreciate you kind of laying out the statutory framework, the policy framework. I want to start with that and then talk about a couple of other issues that are raised. But I guess the first question is, what do you think should be done about the you laid out a process which is elaborate, but either based on your talk, is sometimes subject to idiosyncratic policies. In the case of practices, I guess I want to hear a little more about how much is policy versus practice, with regard to Israel specifically, but also one which, even if we had this conversation a year ago, would be problematic on many levels. So first of all, the scale of military assistance from the United States, the fact that it appears that our enormous military industrial complex, which we as a as a society, have been concerned about since the 50s, drive so much of American foreign policy and arguably distorts you brought up, for example, the long heralded pivot to Asia that never happens because we're constantly sucked up into the Middle East, and the sort of endless array of urgent problems that overtake important, so that has nothing to do with October 7th. That's just kind of a layout of what's there. So, what would you propose should be done in the near term about fixing these structural problems?

Josh Paul 33:08

So, there are a number of responses to that. I think, before we even talk about fixing the structural problems, I think you know, the thing that stands out to me the most is that we need to enforce our own laws right and before we talk about policy changes and any of that. But when it comes to our structural problems, I think there are several. First of all, I think there is a need for legislative fixes to some of this in part. So for example, take those Leahy laws that say you can't provide assistance to a unit credibly alleged violation to human rights. The fact that those laws don't apply when it is a country using its own funding, seems like a gaping hole. And so, I think there are a number of issues here that do require legislative fixes. There are also structural problems in the way the arms transfer process works. So if you think about who has a voice in the arms transfer process. Certainly, the country requesting the arms has a voice. The US Embassy from that that is based in that country always chimes in, because they're required to provide a country team assessment. Shocker, the US Embassy always endorses a request made by a country, because what is the US Embassy interested in? Access to that country and access to that government. The US company, the defense manufacturer, always has a voice in this process, right? And they're chiming in. And typically, or very often, the member of Congress representing the district where the equipment will be made has a voice because they're aware of it through a defense company and is chiming in. The Defense Department, the State Department, within the State Department, you know my old Bureau of Political, Military Affairs, you know the one voice, in this that sort of talks to the human rights piece is the Human Rights Bureau at the State Department, the Bureau of Democracy, Rights and Labor, DRL. They have a voice, but they don't have a definitive choice. They don't make the decision. Political military affairs makes the decision and can take their recommendation or ignore it. Who doesn't have a voice are those who are going to be on the receiving end of the arms, and so to the extent that it is possible for us to bring those voices into the decision making process, whether through consultation in country with civil society, whether in consultation and expanding the opportunities for us civil society to advise and inform, whether, through bringing into the framework some solid considerations beyond the cap policy, such as the democratization of the country, the Democratic the Freedom Index, the Development Index, the amount of oversight of the security sector and the checks and balances on the military. These are all things that can be brought into the process to help restructure some of what is happening.

Student Question 35:56

Are there more things that you think could or should happen on the executive level? So, you talked a lot about Congress just now. Obviously, Congress is very important. But it seemed like in your talk that many of the issues that most troubled you in practice were actually emanating from the executive branch.

Josh Paul 36:11

Yeah, so I think, we have a problem, right? And I think that that's one of the, one of the things that makes what is happening right now an issue not just of foreign policy, but an issue of domestic policy concern too, because, as we know, we've had, you know, for many, many years now, this expanding the imperial presidency. One of the key criticisms, and I think rightly so, that was made of the Trump administration, including by candidate Joe Biden, was that of their disregard, and of Trump's disregard for following the law, and yet, when it is politically convenient, we now still have a president who is refusing to enforce certain laws or refusing to follow certain laws. And I think that that does have significant concerns and leads to significant concerns for the rule of law in this country, and that is compounded by a further challenge under American law, which is that for almost any of these laws that I've been discussing, there's no right of private action. Right, so the US, for example, is signatory to the Genocide Convention and has implementing law under the Genocide Convention, and there is a case that has been brought before the district court in California is currently being appealed on bank to the ninth circuit that says, you know, we are seeking an injunction against the transfer of arms to Israel. And it's by, you know, the plaintiffs are a group of Palestinian Americans with family who have been killed in Gaza by US weapons. You know, the first response from the US government, and the one that initially the case has been initially dismissed on is the question of standing and just disability. But the second question that the US government raised in its response was that, yeah, guess what? If the Department of Justice wants to prosecute someone in the State Department for approving these arms transfers, we can do so, but you Palestinian American who has lost a hundred family members do not have a right to do so. There is no private right of action on that. There is no private right of action on Leahy. On any of this. It is entirely up to the executive branch to decide whether or not it wants to enforce the laws against itself and how, for that matter, it interprets those laws. And I think that is a problem, particularly when you have an issue like this, on which there is, at this point, at least very well organized political pressure to not to enforce those laws, to keep moving forward and no consequences for not doing so. I mean, I would

Student Question 38:37

I mean the Administrative Procedures Act often doesn't apply at all to State Department, action, foreign policy action generally, having nothing to do with military assistance per se, just across the board.

Josh Paul 38:46

Yeah, I think that's, that's an interesting question. I don't want to get too far ahead of anything as you as it was mentioned. I'm working for an organization now called DAWN, and one of the things we are looking at is litigation under the Administrative Procedures Act, because there may be some Nexus here, but it's, it's a high bar, and we'll see.

Student Question 39:04

You sort of introduced both throughout your talk, but you just something you said a moment ago, just made me want to kind of press you on whether you think the larger problem is that the law is not being followed, or that the law is actually written and organized in a distorting way, which is the bigger problem in your view?

Josh Paul 39:22

I think they're both problems. I think, you know, at the end of the day, what we have here is a policy problem and is a legal problem, but most directly, it's a political problem. When we do not have the political will to enforce our laws, when we do not have the political incentives, for members of Congress, for example, who behind closed doors will say what our weapons are doing in Gaza is war crimes. I know that because they've said it to me behind closed doors, but have continued on to say, but I will not say that publicly, what we have ultimately is a legal problem, is a policy problem, but until we fix the politics around this, we're not going to be able to make any progress on either of those.

Student Question 40:08

Okay, so I want open it up to questions. I usually like to start with questions for the students in the room. So if there's a student who wants to kick us off, please raise your hand. Go ahead.

Student Question 40:19

Thank you. My name is Amit. I formally interned with the DRL Bureau, as well as with the US Washington, United Nations, and worked at CSAs think tank in Washington. You were talking about the structural issues. There's no room for policy debate in that compressed timeframe, in the immediate days following the October 7 events. I'm very sympathetic to that argument. I'm also cognizant of fact that we have a Democratic administration. The National Security Council is filled with people who lean left, and Jake Sullivan is a pretty smart guy. I'm just wondering, you know, given that they went with the top down approach, saying, need to prove off on this, what was the interagency politics like? Who was shaping the president's decision making? Because he said the assistant secretary of the DRL Bureau, maybe his voice wasn't heard, was, were the intelligence agencies advising the president primarily? How was the decision making process made in that compressed time frame?

Josh Paul 41:07

Yeah, that's a very good question. So, first of all, I mean, look, ultimate responsibility not only lies with the president, but we've also heard Joe Biden time and time again say exactly where he stands on this issue and what his policies are. So, you know, as much as we can talk about the people around the President, and I think that is, you know, important on a lot of issues, we can't ignore. You know that this is also Joe Biden's policy, you know, that said, I think you also have to look at so I think Brett McGurk and the NSC have played an important role here. So, and we haven't even touched on this, right, but part of the US thinking and this administration's thinking towards the region, and in fact, the major part of it, is framed by their understanding of strategic competition with the People's Republic of China, and in that context, the desire to both lock in another generation of US leadership and lock out The sort of Chinese influence that is growing. And so that's where you get this normalization with Saudi Arabia and all that kind of thing. And which, of course, this conflict has upset. But I think that remains the strategic push. And in that context, I think there is still a belief that the question of Palestine can be, you know, shut away and ignored. You know, let's get through this and, you know, get back to where we were. So, there's that. I think that there's also, you know, particularly in the week or two after October 7, there was a genuine emotional reaction from a lot of senior US government officials, including Tony Blinken, who, you know, went to Israel and spoke of his family there. And I think that that's a problem, because at the end of the day, the role of the US government is to rationally assess what is in the American interest. It is not to respond to emotion with emotion. And we know from 911 and other examples that when we do so, things go off the rails. So I think that's part of the issue. You raise the question of the intelligence community. So that was really a missing piece here. There is, you know, certainly a very close, you know, intelligence relationship with Israel. I think they've tried hard to to separate, you know, direct US involvement. That's proven very difficult. But you know, the US intelligence community can provide you an immense amount of information about al Qaeda ISIS, various military forces in the region, Iran. It does not focus on Israel. It does not focus on the IDF. It does not assess IDF operations. And so while, certainly on the analytical side, there was, and continues to be feedback about, you know, this is the harm that is being done to US interests around the region. This is where we think we see things going. It's my understanding, with my perception, my experience. There wasn't a strong intelligence feed into the decision making on this, because it's just not something that we look at closely. So, you know, I think it was a combination of, again, White House. I think the one voice that has been pushing back, frankly, has often been DOD. I think you have, you know, when you have US military folks, they know, first of all, most of them know that this is not how you conduct this sort of operation, and expect to get to stability peace day after. And you know that on two occasions where I think the US government has intervened effectively, on both of those occasions, it has been through mill, mill ties with Austin or others in DOD, reaching out to the Government of Israel to say, hey, that operation you're about to conduct is going to kill a lot of people, is not going to move the ball forward anymore. Rethink it. So I think, but I think broadly, that's been the dynamic.

Student Question 44:50

Can I ask you to just elaborate on in your answer, you mentioned the growing role of China in the Middle East, which is something I think a lot of us are aware of, and I know absorbs a lot of attention in the beltway. So how do you see that playing out? Because the argument that sometimes gets made is, you know, as was made about the Soviets in the past, if not for us, then they will do X, Y and Z, which is actually more terrible in some way. How do you react to that? How do you kind of contextualize that? Yeah, I

Josh Paul 45:16

think that's a really important question. Because I think that is, I do agree that that is the strategic challenge for the next 20 years or so, if not longer. That said, while I agree that the strategic competition is the key geopolitical challenge the US faces, I think that the Biden administration has fundamentally failed in understanding the nature of that challenge and how to respond to it, so how we are responding to it right now, unfortunately, I have to say, and I thought this long before I left state, looks a lot like how we handled the Cold War. The enemy of our enemy is our friend. We will ally with regimes that are not interested in human rights if they are going to be on side, and we will strengthen those ties with human rights abusers, with autocrats, in order to lock out and bring them into our orbit and keep them out of the PRCs. I think that our competition with China is really not at all like that. You know, first of all, yes, the PRC is certainly expanding its military footprint, expanding its diplomatic influence, but I don't think is interested in, you know, territory, in the way that the Soviet Union was. And instead, I think what we actually have is a competition, not between two countries, but between two templates. And no, there is, I'd like to think a western template, I think that's been brought into question a lot in the last year, but a Western template of, you know, for all its flaws, democratic capitalism, free markets, but also freedom of speech, individual rights, human rights, you know, and all this sort of thing. And then there is a template that is offered, I don't think push, but offered by the PRC, which is, no, no, you can have all the benefits of the free market, all that capitalist growth, bringing all those people, and that's an amazing thing out of poverty. But you can draw a line, and you don't have to have the messiness that is democracy. You can draw a line between people's involvement in the market versus people's involvement in the politics. And I think that what we are doing first of all, with our policies towards Israel, but also, more broadly, in the Middle East, fundamentally underlines the main appeal that we have, which is not to autocracies, which is not to regimes. It is to people. Instead of appealing to people, instead of building those ties, what we have been offering is military alliances. In the case of for example, both the Avon Accords, as they are with the UAE and now expanding and trying to offer a defense pact to Saudi Arabia. While at the same time, because our policies are creating so much discord and so much instability within regimes in Jordan, for example, and elsewhere, having to double down on our support to those autocratic regimes and only strengthening the autocratic movement over the democratic movement, which we have now aligned ourselves against. So, we have taken our key attraction, which is our values, off the table, and I think that at the end of the day, no matter how many defense guarantees, how much defense hardware we offer to the UAE, to Saudi, to other countries in those sorts of conditions. In the long term, they are going to find the Chinese model more attractive, for lack of a better term, right? The PRC model more attractive, because what they want at the end of the day is the economic growth, but the political control. And so, I think we are just undermining our own interests at the end of the day. And yes, in the short term, you might get some sort of, you know, defense treaty, and, you know, an expanded US military presence, but we are not going to win over those countries, because that is not at the end of the day what they'll take it and then they will still, you know, at the end of the day wind up closer to to that model and to you know that PRC approach of, hey, no strings attached. Here you go. Have everything you want, and don't worry about the democratization. So I think it's deeply harmful in that way as well.

Student Question 49:15

Other student questions, go ahead. Are you sorry? Are you a student? Yes, yes. Go ahead. Hi.

Jessica Peake 49:20

My name is Calia. I'm a current UCLA undergraduate student. I read your article in the or your interview in The New Yorker, and you talked about how your time in Ramallah led you to believe that the US Israeli, like allyship, is not ultimately helping security in Israel. I was wondering why you think we have this special relationship with Israel to the point where half of our foreign funding goes there, and even though the ICG has recently ruled about the illegal occupation of the West Bank, and, you know, the South African 1000, like, why are we attaching ourselves to what's essentially a sinking ship? Is it the Israeli lobby? Is it because we want the weapon weapons don't hold there, or like, personal beliefs of government officials just being perpetra? Why are we continuing this, even though the global discourse around Israel is becoming so anti

Josh Paul 50:06

Yeah, I think that's a really fundamental question. And, you know, just to knock out a couple of the ones that you mentioned. So for example, you know, people often point to the military industrial complex as the problem here. I actually don't think that's right. I think, yes, the US, you know, does sell a significant number of arms to Israel. But, you know, in talking, and I've been talking with a number of folks in defense industry, you know, remember that funding we were talking about that goes to Israel. A big chunk of that also goes not to buy US arms, but to be invested in the Israeli Defense industrial base. Israel is now a top 10 global exporter of arms and so us, defense industry perspective is, why the heck are we funding our competition? So, so, you know, that's, that's, I don't think that's the problem here. Yes, there are as well. I think, as we've seen, you know, some, I would say perhaps more tactical benefits and strategic benefits to the relationship. So, you know, this is a question I've asked people repeatedly, what is the strategic net benefit that we get from our relationship with Israel? And what people will point back to is particularly, you know, okay, economic and tech sector in particular, ties, but also counterterrorism cooperation, intelligence cooperation. But the problem is, most of the stuff that we're dealing with in the counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation spheres wouldn't be a problem if it wasn't for our relationship in the first place. So, I think this does come back to, you know, a very effective political machinery here in the US and ecosystem that has been pushing a set of policies that are ultimately not in the American interests. And that's why you have, you know, increasingly majorities in the American population who disagree with our policy and yet politicians who refuse to adjust their positions to reflect that. I've talked to a number of congressional staffers in this context, who said, you know, our officers have been getting calls on a ten to one ratio, pushing for a ceasefire, immediate ceasefire, and that sort of thing. But my member is unwilling to shift, or my Chief of Staff is unwilling even to tell my member about this ratio, because they fear that there are two or three key donors that we will lose if we change opposition. So, I don't want to overstate that. I also think that one of the challenges is not the presence of that. I wouldn't even call it a pro Israel lobby. I'll call it a pro Likud, or write a Likud lobby. It actually isn't a pro Israel lobby, because I think Israel's current policies are deeply damaging to Israel's own interests. But part of the problem, as well, is the absence of a lobby on the other side, and that there aren't really effective this. You know, right now, there's a lot of energy momentum, but we've seen a lot of energy momentum before, and we know that it goes up and then it goes down, and, you know, miracles get distracted. And so I think one of the challenges is finding a way to funnel this current focus and energy into enduring political institutions that can essentially play the same game.

Student 53:10

Thank you.

Josh Paul 53:11

Thank you.

Student Question 53:12

Other questions, floor is open. Peggy. Go ahead.

UCLA Staff 53:16

So, what do you think the role of the street is playing now both in Arab nations and in the US, like the we haven't had a reaction against a war like this since, really Vietnam, but it's being suppressed largely by it's not being recorded or accurately reported, I would say, by the media, which is failing on all constant, but in in Arab countries you could push, you could push the Abraham accords and relationships with Israel, but not when Palestinians are being killed in such huge numbers. Do you feel in either place that voice history is going to have any effect?

Josh Paul 53:57

Yeah, so Middle East first, I think we've seen so some impact there, right? So, for example, on the Saudi normalization question, I think it was, if it was purely up to Mohammed bin Salman, they'll be done already. I don't think Mohammed bin Salman gives a particular toss about, you know, Palestinian lives. I don't think he particularly cares about, you know, the lives of the average Saudis, either, but, but, you know, there was a poll that came out in January, the only poll that's been done of Saudi population that said in January, 93% now oppose normalization. And I think you know, in someone is cognizant of, you know, the political tensions and the pressure, and that has led Saudi Arabia to put in writing that it will not advance normalization until there is measurable progress towards Palestinian statehood and a ceasefire. So that is an example of how even a muted voice has still been heard. I think by the leadership there. There's also an increasing risk, as we've discussed, of destabilization. I think if you look at China. Jordan, in particular, situation is incredibly precarious right now. And if there is an escalation in the West Bank, as there has started to be, you know that I think that there is a real risk there. And of course, you know, if there is an escalation into Lebanon, I think, you know, the region as a whole faces a lot of challenges. So I think there is a voice on the streets there, the problem is that it is a repressed voice, but it's still having some impact here in the US. I think that there have been two particularly effective street voices, for lack of a better term. One of those is the uncommitted movement. I think that you know the uncommitted movement. So this was the effort during the democratic primaries to get people to vote uncommitted and saying to them, look, you know, you're not, this isn't the election between, you know, Trump and Biden, as it was at the time. You know, this isn't going to be, you know, the end of democracy, but you can send a clear vote that your vote is on the line by, you know, registering as a democrat and then voting uncommitted. And you know, particularly in the April timeframe, when Rafa was very much on the agenda. That did lead to, certainly, a change in tone from the Biden administration, and also some decisions. So there was a UN vote where the US abstained for the first time on a ceasefire question. There was a decision to suspend a single transfer, a single shipment of arms, which hasn't happened before or since. And there was also some military to military intersession between the US and Israel, on Rafah itself and on that operation, which I think actually had an impact on the Israeli calculus and on the Israeli decision making. So, so, I think that movement, and as well, I think the, frankly, the campus protest movement has been a very important voice, particularly to the democratic side, where, you know, this is the future base. This is the people who are going to be voting. And you know, who would have guessed a year ago that for so many students, this would be the fundamental, the important issue of their of their student, you know, careers of their student time. And I think it's become an important issue, not only in terms of the foreign policy impacts and questions, but also in terms of what it means for freedom of speech at home and for freedom of association. And, you know, I heard, you know, I was up in Dartmouth in May, and there was a student there, you know, I was talking to a class, and there was a student who, you know, had, you know, baseball cap on, and, you know, basketball shirts and just, you know, total jock sort of character. And he said to me, you know, I don't care about the Middle East. I don't care about Israel or Palestine. I'm not interested. But when you arrest my friends, I care. And so I think that the Democratic Party is going to have to take notice of that if it wants to, you know, retain that level of support amongst the youth, and so I think that is a very important voice.

Student Question 57:48

Other questions so many over here, please go ahead.

Student 57:53

First of all, disclosure, I'm not a lawyer. I'm not in the law school. Sorry,

Josh Paul 57:56

I'm not a lawyer either.

Student Question 57:59

So this will not be the first time that the United States is supporting, as you said, a dictatorship or regime that are working against human rights. What will be in your if you have a magic wand, what will be your solution to the Israeli Palestinian issue, given that neither side is a monolithic right, there is no Israel, there is no Palestine. In Palestine, we have Hamas and we have the PLO. In the recent poll that was published in the West Bank, 70% of the population of West Bank support Hamas, while Hamas supporting Gaza fell in Israel, you have almost a Civil War when you have a very center left body of politics that want to change. So if you're the magic wand, what would be your vision, view of US, interest in US, policy? Yeah, towards the Middle East.

Josh Paul 58:53

I mean, I think, first of all, for the reasons that you've outlined, this is not a problem that is going to be solved by leaving it to Israelis and Palestinians. They obviously have to be part of the solution, but there is clearly a need for some sort of international pressure on both sides and a different approach. I mean, you mentioned Palestinians supporting the West Bank for Hamas. Part of the issue there is that the Palestinian authority itself has become essentially the implementer of Israel's occupation, and therefore has no legitimacy. And so there has to be a significant opportunity for shifts and for debate within Palestinian society. I also think that you know, as much as the Israeli left showed itself in the judicial reform protests last year, and there have been some protests, you know, and particularly in the last few days, by and large, the Israeli left, frankly, is not concerned with Palestinian human rights. It is concerned with its own set of issues, and the growing autocracy within Israel and the growing, you know, religious control and all that sort of thing. So, you know, I don't want to be too depressing. I will say that, you know, I'd worked in Iraq before I worked in Ramallah. I'd worked in the Pentagon, on the hill, in the State Department. And I think there is an American conception, an American conceit, that first of all, every problem has a solution, and second of all, America can bring that solution. And I think you know, one thing we have to recognize is that not every problem has a solution, and sometimes the best you can do is, first of all, stop making things worse, and second of all, get things to a position where solutions can emerge. So, I think that is what we have to be doing right now. Is, first of all, I'm not going to sit here and tell you this is how we fix things. I don't know. I think that is ultimately a question for Palestinians and for Israelis. It is not something that can be imposed, but it's certainly something that needs to be facilitated. So first of all, stop making things worse. Stop sending the bombs that are killing so many. Stop facilitating restrictions on humanitarian systems, all that sort of thing, then take the steps that can lead to a place from which solutions can emerge. And I'm not sure that that actually has to be the United States. I think when it comes to Israel, we have a very important voice. We have a very effective leverage. And there we certainly need to continue to play a role, but I also think we've undermined our own credibility incredibly. I don't know why the Palestinians would think of us for a second as an honest broker. That's laughable, but I think there is, you know, I believe strongly in the West, and I wish that we would empower Europe to take a more effective role here, or other countries with who are like minded. But I think that sometimes the answer is for us to step back right now. The problem is that we are deep in the middle of things.

Student Question 1:01:53

May I have a quick follow up?

Kal Raustiala 1:01:55

Very quick, and that'll be our last.

Student Question 1:01:56

So that sounds to me that (unknown word) managed the conflict philosophy, and it just differs on the details. Is it what you're suggesting, that the conflict cannot be solved presently, but needs to be managed until the generation will come forward?

Josh Paul 1:02:09

No, no, I'm not suggesting that. I think that there are, it depends what you mean by the conflict, right? But I think that you know the current I mean, I think right now, Netanyahu is extending the current conflict for his own political interest, you know. Now, you know. I mean, does that mean that, you know, without Netanyahu, peace would break out tomorrow? No, it doesn't. There are significant issues within Israeli society that need to be resolved. There are significant restrictions, and the occupation has to be rolled back for this to work. And seeing how that is possible with the presence of so many settlements, it's very difficult, and this will require external pressure, particularly on Israel as the more powerful partner in this relationship between Israel and Palestine, to move forward. So that's what I'm saying, not that this is something that has to be managed and can there people will be trying to decide it has to be proactively addressed and managed because left to itself, it will only continue to get worse.

Student Question 1:03:06

Okay, so, unfortunately, we're at the end of our time, Josh. Thank you so much. Please join me in thanking Josh Paul.

Transcribed by https://otter.ai